

ER - # 84-957



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-7676

9 March 1984

STAT

Thank you for your letter of 26 February to Director Casey, for whom I am responding.

I am sorry we are unable to help you. Mr. Casey has not commented publicly on the 7 June 1981 incident involving the bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq, and believes it would not be appropriate for him to do so now.

Sincerely,

STAT

George V. Lauder  
Director, Public Affairs

Distribution:

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# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## ROUTING SLIP

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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

  
 Executive Secretary

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Date

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Executive Registry

84-957

26 February 1984

Mr. William J. Casey  
The Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C.  
20505  
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Casey:

Particulars of my background can be found in the curriculum vitae attached to this letter. With your permission, then, I shall proceed directly to the subject of my appeal.

Perhaps it is presumptuous of me to appeal to you directly, in view of your singular role as director of the C.I.A., but nevertheless, I hope you will understand what has prompted this letter.

I am currently completing a book on the June 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. From the diversified material that has reached me from various sources, including some in Washington, I learned of the position you had taken in this regard. Without further ado, I will tell you briefly what I know, and shall anxiously await your reaction.

According to the information in my possession, you held that the Iraqi nuclear reactor wasn't suited to the production of energy for peaceful objectives. The ultimate purpose of the reactor was to produce an atomic bomb, but Iraq wouldn't have had the capacity to do so prior to 1983 or 1984. At the same time, you confirmed that the reactor had become "hot" in 1981. You also confirmed that I.A.E.A. supervision had been deficient. Is this information accurate? If not, which facts are imprecise?

You further contended that the Egyptian president's status had been eroded as a result; that U.S.-Iraqi relations had suffered; that the Soviets had benefited from the bombing. In your opinion, have these claims proven themselves?

As you know, the U.S. made extensive diplomatic efforts to persuade France and Italy to scale down, if not halt, the transfer of technological resources which would allow Iraq to advance towards its longed-for goal of producing nuclear weaponry. To the sorrow of the entire free world, the U.S. failed in its attempt. Why, in your opinion, was the U.S. unable to prevail in this regard?

With your background, you are well aware that history is made up of myriad details which pieced together, form the complete story. I would therefore be deeply indebted if you would contribute to the effort of telling the story as it happened.

Respectfully yours,

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DCI  
EXEC  
REG

STAT

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